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I. IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (Korematsu 
Center) is a non-profit organization based at the Seattle University School 
of Law.  The Korematsu Center works to advance justice through 
research, advocacy, and education.  Inspired by the legacy of Fred 
Korematsu, who defied military orders during World War II that 
ultimately led to the unlawful incarceration of 110,000 Japanese 
Americans, the Korematsu Center works to advance social justice for all.  
It has a special interest in ensuring that juvenile sentencing reflects the 
widely accepted body of scientific literature demonstrating that youth are 
less culpable and have a greater capacity for reformation.  The Korematsu 
Center also works to understand and remedy the racial disproportionality 
that plagues our criminal justice system, including how the auto-decline 
statute disproportionately subjects youth of color to adult punishment.  
The Korematsu Center does not, in this brief or otherwise, represent the 
official views of Seattle University. 
II. ISSUE ADDRESSED BY AMICUS 
Whether Washington’s “auto-decline” statute, 
RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v), which requires that certain juvenile offenders be 
tried as adults without regard for their individual characteristics or 





article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution, and the prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment.  
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Zyion Houston-Sconiers and Treson Roberts were convicted for 
their participation in a group of youth that robbed trick-or-treaters at 
gunpoint on Halloween night, 2012.  The group stole candy and a phone 
but inflicted no bodily harm.  Zyion was 17 at the time of the offense, and 
Treson was 16. 
Normally, defendants under the age of 18 are subject to the 
exclusive original jurisdiction of the juvenile courts.  But because of their 
ages and the crimes with which they were charged, Zyion and Treson were 
subject to Washington’s “auto-decline” statute, under which adult courts 
have automatic, exclusive jurisdiction over 16- and 17-year-old offenders 
charged with certain offenses.  The purpose of the auto-decline statute is 
to expose juveniles to adult sentencing schemes, including mandatory 
enhancements.  As a result of mandatory firearm enhancements, Zyion 
was sentenced to 31 years in prison, and Treson was sentenced to 26 
years.  The trial court had no discretion to impose shorter sentences, and it 
had no discretion to evaluate whether treatment of these teenage 
defendants as adults was appropriate in the first place. 





dissented, arguing that imposing these sentences mechanically, “as though 
by the touch of gear on gear,” violated the Eighth Amendment.  State v. 
Houston-Sconiers, 191 Wn. App. 436, ¶ 35 (2015) (Bjorgen, J., 
dissenting).  He argued that the sentences could not be imposed without 
the “exercise of human discretion, taking into account all that law and 
science tells us about the nature of juveniles and the possibility of 
amendment of life.”  Id. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Children are different from adults, and two children of the same 
age can be very different from one another.  Over the last decade, both this 
Court and the United States Supreme Court have recognized that these 
differences are of constitutional significance, and have thus repeatedly 
struck down sentencing schemes that do not allow consideration of a 
defendant’s youthfulness. 
Washington’s “auto-decline” statute, in concert with the state’s 
adult sentencing laws, creates precisely the kind of impermissible scheme 
that recent case law has rejected.  Under the auto-decline statute, a 16- or 
17-year-old defendant charged with certain crimes is automatically tried in 
adult court, with no opportunity to demonstrate that his or her 
youthfulness and related characteristics make trial as an adult 





automatically sentenced as an adult.  In some cases—including this one—
the defendant is subject to mandatory enhancements that result in decades-
long sentences plainly inappropriate for the vast majority of juveniles.   
Even where mandatory enhancements do not apply, a teenage 
defendant bears the burden to prove that his or her characteristics warrant 
an exceptional downward sentence, creating a perverse presumption that 
children are adults until proven otherwise.  In either case, juvenile 
defendants subject to auto-decline face a significant probability of 
receiving sentences that are disproportionate in light of their youthfulness.  
At least until substantial new safeguards are enacted for youth defendants 
sentenced in adult courts,1 that probability renders the auto-decline statute 
unconstitutional under both article I, section 14 and the Eighth 
Amendment. 
                                                 
1 The so-called legislative Miller fix provides procedural safeguards to youth offenders 
convicted of aggravated murder, allowing those offenders to petition the indeterminate 
sentence review board for early release at 5 years prior to the expiration of their 
minimum term. RCW 10.95.030(3).  And RCW 9.94A.730 provides a similar procedural 
safeguard to youth offenders convicted of crimes committed before their eighteenth 
birthdays who are serving sentences longer than 20 years, by allowing those offenders to 
petition for early release after serving 20 years.  However, these two statutes do not reach 
all juveniles sentenced as adults by operation of the auto-decline statute.  Further, these 
statutes do nothing to prevent the initial imposition of unconstitutional sentences—i.e., 
sentences imposed without consideration of the offender’s youth and individual 
circumstances.  A disproportionate sentence is disproportionate on the day it is imposed, 






A. Article I, section 14 of the Washington constitution prohibits 
disproportionate sentences and therefore requires sentencing 
courts to consider an offender’s youthfulness. 
The Washington constitution prohibits “cruel punishment,” Const. 
art. I, § 14, and it “is more protective than the Eighth Amendment” 
prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment.”  State v. Witherspoon, 180 
Wn.2d 875, 887 (2014).  In addition to proscribing “certain modes of 
punishment,” this provision requires that “sentences of ordinary 
imprisonment” be “proportional[]”—that is, “commensurate with the 
crimes for which such sentences are imposed.”  State v. Fain, 94 Wn.2d 
387, 395-96 (1980). 
Recent developments in the jurisprudence of this Court and the 
U.S. Supreme Court have established that the youthfulness of a juvenile 
defendant is central to the proportionality inquiry.  This jurisprudential 
shift also recognizes that sentencing schemes that do not allow adequate 
consideration of the youthfulness of juvenile offenders create a substantial 
risk that disproportionate sentences will be imposed, rendering the 
schemes themselves incompatible with the constitutional proportionality 
requirement.  In this case, the Court should recognize that the auto 





section 142 and the Eighth Amendment, as it subjects youth to sentencing 
schemes that do not permit adequate consideration of youthfulness.   
1. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 
youthfulness must be considered when sentencing 
juvenile offenders. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that the 
substantive standards imposed by the Eighth Amendment progress over 
time, keeping pace with the “evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society” and incorporating new insights and 
knowledge that bear on the legitimacy of certain criminal punishments.  
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560-61, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 
(2005) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01, 78 S. Ct. 590, 2 L. 
Ed. 2d 630 (1958) (plurality op.)).  Thus, while in 1878 it was “safe to 
                                                 
2 Petitioners argue in their supplemental briefs that the auto-decline statute violates 
article I, section 14.  Br. of Pet. Houston-Sconiers at 16; Br. of Pet. Roberts.  In the event 
this Court concludes that this state constitutional argument was not adequately raised 
below by the parties, but see Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L. 
Ed. 2d 438 (1971) (party need not “cit[e] ‘book and verse’” to preserve constitutional 
argument); RAP 2.5(a)(3), the Court should nonetheless exercise its discretion to 
consider it here.  See Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 46 v. City of Everett, 146 Wn.2d 
29, 36-37 (2002) (Supreme Court may consider argument not raised below where issue is 
of public importance and addressing it would serve judicial economy).  Ensuring fair and 
humane treatment of children in the criminal justice system is a matter of paramount 
public importance.  And the volume of litigation in this Court and the Courts of Appeals 
involving the auto-decline statute demonstrates that resolving questions regarding the 
validity of that statute here will serve judicial economy significantly.  See, e.g., State v. 
Posey, 161 Wn.2d 638 (2012) (addressing effect of acquittal on count that qualified youth 
defendant for auto-decline); State v. Salavea, 151 Wn.2d 133 (2004) (addressing time at 
which age criterion must be satisfied); In re Pers. Restraint Petition of Dalluge, 152 
Wn.2d 772 (2004) (effect of dismissal of qualifying count); State v. Mora, 138 Wn.2d 43 
(1999) (same); State v. Solis-Diaz, 194 Wn. App.129 (2016) (vacating second adult 
sentence of youth defendant subject to auto-decline after successful petition for post-





affirm” that drawing and quartering, public dissection, and burning at the 
stake would violate the Constitution, Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-
36, 25 L. Ed. 345 (1878), over the course of the twentieth century the 
Court extended the reach of the Eighth Amendment to prohibit more than 
patently barbaric modes of execution.  It applied the provision to 
invalidate a severe prison sentence for falsifying public records, Weems v. 
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382, 30 S. Ct. 544, 54 L. Ed. 793 (1910), to 
prohibit any custodial punishment at all under a statute that criminalized 
addiction to narcotics, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667, 82 S. 
Ct. 1417, 8 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1962), and to hold generally that a “criminal 
sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant was 
convicted,” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 
2d 637 (1983).3 
The Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in this century has 
centered on its evolving understanding of the characteristics of children 
and how these characteristics in youth offenders bear upon the traditional 
retributive goals of the criminal justice system.  In Roper, the Court 
invalidated the death sentence of a defendant who was 17 when he 
                                                 
3 The Court addressed the proportionality standard again in a fractured series of opinions 
in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991).  
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in that case adopted a “grossly disproportionate” 
standard for constitutional review of the length of prison sentences.  Id. at 1001 





committed the crime of which he was convicted.  543 U.S. at 556.  It 
explained that three “general differences between juveniles under 18 and 
adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be 
classified among the worst offenders.”  Id. at 569.  First, “as any parent 
knows and as … scientific and sociological studies … tend to confirm,” 
the “lack of maturity and … underdeveloped sense of responsibility” that 
are understandably found in children “often result in impetuous and ill-
considered actions and decisions.”  Id. (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Second, “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to 
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”  Id.  
Finally, the “character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an 
adult,” meaning that juvenile defendants, in general, are more likely to be 
successfully reformed.  Id. at 570.  The upshot was that a death sentence 
that may be permissible for an adult offender could not be imposed on 
juvenile offenders “whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, 
to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.”  Id. at 571. 
Five years later, in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 
2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010), the Court followed the reasoning in 
Roper to hold that a sentence of life in prison without parole for a juvenile 
convicted of a non-homicide crime violated the Eighth Amendment.  It 





and criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into 
account at all would be flawed.”  Id. at 76.   
In Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), 
the Court extended its holdings in Roper and Graham to hold that “penalty 
schemes” that include mandatory life-without-parole sentences for 
juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment because they impose harsh 
sentences without appropriate consideration of the youthfulness of the 
defendant.  Id. at 2466.  “By removing youth from the balance,” the 
mandatory schemes the Court invalidated “prevent[ed] the sentencer from 
taking into account [the] central considerations” identified in Graham.  
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466.   
Most recently, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 193 L. 
Ed. 2d 599 (2016), the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
on mandatory life without parole for juveniles that was recognized in 
Miller was a “substantive right” (and therefore retroactive), and explicitly 
stated that “[a] hearing where ‘youth and its attendant characteristics’ are 
considered as sentencing factors is necessary to separate those juveniles 
who may be sentenced to life without parole from those who may not.”  
Id. at 736 (citation omitted). 
The quartet of cases beginning with Roper establish that children 





sentences that may be appropriate for adult defendants are nonetheless 
unconstitutional when imposed on juveniles.   
2. In State v. O’Dell, this Court recognized that 
youthfulness must be considered whenever young 
offenders are sentenced. 
This Court followed the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions described above in State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680 (2015).4  
There, this Court reversed the 95-month sentence of a defendant who had 
committed statutory rape 10 days after his 18th birthday.  The trial court 
imposed the sentence after concluding that it was barred from 
“consider[ing] age as a mitigating circumstance” under adult sentencing 
scheme.  Id. at 685.  Relying extensively on Eighth Amendment 
precedents and “advances in the scientific literature,” this Court held that a 
trial court “must be allowed to consider youth as a mitigating factor when 
imposing a sentence” on young-adult defendants who were just over 18 
when they committed their crimes.  Id. at 695-96 (emphasis added).   
Even though the defendant in O’Dell was, in fact, a young adult at 
the time the offense was committed, this Court’s decision relied upon the 
recent developments in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and recognized 
more broadly that there must be a meaningful opportunity to consider the 
                                                 
4 The State’s attempt to limit Miller’s application in Washington, Resp’t Br. at 13-14, 





youthfulness and maturity of a young defendant before a sentence can be 
imposed.  And, like the Court in Miller, this Court reversed the sentence of 
the defendant in O’Dell without finding that that sentence was, in fact, 
disproportionate to the defendant’s offense.  Rather, the sentence was 
invalid because, as a procedural matter, the trial court failed to consider the 
defendant’s youthfulness as a potential mitigating factor.  Id. at 698-99. 
3. Criminal procedures that prevent adequate 
consideration of the youthfulness of juvenile defendants 
at sentencing violate the Eighth Amendment and 
article I, section 14. 
Roper, Graham, and Miller also demonstrate that sentencing 
regimes that fail to provide an adequate opportunity for consideration of 
the youthfulness of juvenile defendants are themselves unconstitutional. 
Critically, the Court in Miller did not hold merely that disproportionate 
sentences that resulted from a flawed scheme violated the Eighth 
Amendment.  Instead, it held that the scheme itself was unconstitutional—
recognizing a procedural corollary to the right against cruel and unusual 
punishment that “require[s]” the state to “take into account how children 
are different, and how those differences counsel against” extraordinarily 
severe sentences.  132 S. Ct. at 2469; Graham, 560 U.S. at 76; see also 
Houston-Sconiers, 191 Wn. App. ¶ 35 (Bjorgen, J., dissenting) (“The 





possibility of forfeitures of such magnitude to be raised automatically for 
crimes committed by children.”) (emphasis added).5  Because article I, 
section 14 is more protective than the Eighth Amendment, it follows that 
our state constitution must also prohibit procedures that prevent courts 
from considering the youthfulness of juvenile offenders. 
B. The auto-decline statute prevents adequate consideration of 
the youthfulness of juvenile offenders and creates a 
constitutionally significant risk of disproportionate 
punishment, in violation of article I, section 14. 
Just as the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that criminal 
procedures that create a significant risk of disproportionate sentences by 
preventing adequate consideration of a juvenile defendant’s youthfulness 
violate the Eighth Amendment, this Court should hold that the auto-
decline statute violates article I, section 14.  As set forth in more detail 
below, the auto-decline statute both deprives the juvenile offender of the 
opportunity to establish lessened culpability at a declination hearing and 
                                                 
5 These cases also call into question the narrow view articulated by this Court in In re 
Boot that Eighth Amendment issues are “not ordinarily . . . ripe for adjudication until . . . 
[a defendant is] actually sentenced.”  130 Wn.2d 553, 569 (1996).  Graham and Miller 
invalidated the entire sentencing schemes under which the individual sentences at issue 
were imposed, teaching that for Eighth Amendment purposes (and therefore for article I, 
section 14 purposes as well), the constitutional analysis of punishment focuses on 
statutory schemes as a whole, and not simply at the sentences received.  Graham, 560 
U.S. at 76 (“criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into 
account at all would be flawed.”); Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466.  In any event, the petitioners 





subjects that juvenile offender to adult sentencing schemes.6 Sentencing a 
juvenile under an adult sentencing scheme carries with it a constitutionally 
cognizable risk that juvenile defendants will be sentenced without 
adequate consideration of their particular maturity and other age-related 
characteristics.7    
1. The auto-decline statute prevents consideration of 
youthfulness at two distinct points. 
The auto-decline statute was enacted with the intention to “address 
the problem of youth violence by increasing the severity and certainty of 
punishment for youth who commit violent acts.”  State v. Mora, 138 
Wn.2d 43, 50 (1999).  It operates by preventing the consideration of the 
youthfulness of defendants at two distinct points in the life of the case.  
First, auto-decline deprives the juvenile court of the opportunity to 
conduct a decline hearing at the outset of the case.8  A decline hearing 
                                                 
6 The State’s acknowledgement of the purpose of the auto-decline statute—“to increase 
potential punishment for certain [juvenile] offenders,” Resp’t Br. at 15 —contradicts its 
own assertion later in its brief that “[a]ssignment of certain older juveniles who are 
charged with violent or other serious crimes to adult court is not punitive in nature,” 
Resp’t Br. at 18, and belies its characterization of the issue in this case as one merely of 
jurisdiction.  Both petitioners and amicus ask this Court to determine whether the risks 
and consequences that flow from the auto-decline statute pass constitutional muster.   
7 In Boot, 130 Wn.2d 553, this Court rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to the 
auto-decline statute on ripeness grounds, as the defendants had not yet been sentenced.  
The Court did not hold that sentencing children as adults without consideration of their 
youth and related individual factors was permissible.  And even if it had, that conclusion 
is flatly contradicted by Miller.  Importantly, moreover, the Court in Boot explicitly 
acknowledged that it considered “only federal constitutional law”—it did not consider 
article I, section 14.  Id. at 569. 
8 When a juvenile is charged with a crime that is not subject to the auto-decline statute, 





requires the juvenile court to “consider the relevant reports, facts, 
opinions, and arguments presented by the parties and their counsel,” which 
may include evidence regarding the youthfulness and maturity of the 
defendant.  RCW 13.40.110(3).  Thus, the auto-decline statute precludes 
any judicial consideration of the particular characteristics of the juvenile 
before it automatically subjects the juvenile to adjudication in adult court.  
Even if adult court is plainly an inappropriate forum for a particular 
juvenile offender, or if adult penalties are plainly disproportionate for a 
teenager, the adult court has no authority to remand a case governed by 
auto-decline to juvenile court without the consent of the prosecutor.  
RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(E)(III).  This is precisely the sort of law 
“prevent[ing]” consideration of the particular characteristics of a juvenile 
offender that the Federal and Washington constitutions prohibit.  Miller, 
132 S. Ct. at 2458; O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d at 696-99. 
Second, auto-decline subjects juvenile defendants to adult 
sentencing, which never provides an adequate opportunity for 
consideration of a juvenile defendant’s youthfulness, and can result in 
long mandatory sentence enhancements—as Zyion’s and Treson’s 
                                                                                                                         
a finding that the declination would be in the best interest of the juvenile or the public.”  
RCW 13.40.110(3).  While decline hearings are discretionary in many cases, they are 
mandatory for certain offenses—if a 16- or 17-year-old defendant is charged with a Class 






sentences so powerfully reflect.  Zyion was sentenced to “the mandatory 
372 months’ confinement”—31 years—for the seven firearms 
enhancements with which he was charged.  Treson was sentenced to 312 
months—26 years—for six firearms enhancements.  The trial court had no 
discretion to reduce or decline to impose those sentences—even in the 
face of the State’s recommendation that both defendants receive 
exceptional sentences of zero months for the underlying crimes, which the 
trial court followed.  Houston-Sconiers, 191 Wn. App. ¶ 7.  That Zyion 
and Treson would enter prison as teenagers and not be released until they 
were middle-aged adults could not affect this mandatory sentence.   
Thus, in this situation, the law “fail[s] to take defendants’ 
youthfulness into account at all”—exactly the kind of procedure the Court 
in Graham described as “flawed.”  Graham, 560 U.S. at 76.  The auto-
decline statute first prevented Zyion and Treson from advocating that their 
cases be tried in juvenile court, and then subjected them to the adult 
sentencing scheme, which imposed mandatory decades-long sentences and 
precluded the sentencing court from adequately “consider[ing] youth as a 
mitigating factor when imposing a sentence.”  O’Dell,  183 Wn.2d at 
696.9  
                                                 
9 Zyion Houston-Sconiers and Treson Roberts were sentenced before this Court decided 





2. The auto-decline statute creates a constitutionally 
significant risk that juvenile offenders will receive 
disproportionate sentences under adult sentencing 
schemes. 
Even if the operation of auto-decline does not result in 
disproportionate sentences in every case, it is unconstitutional simply 
because it “poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.”  Miller, 
132 S. Ct. at 2469.  Even where a juvenile defendant subject to auto-
decline does not face a mandatory sentencing enhancement, he or she still 
faces treatment as an adult under the Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”).  
See RCW 9.94A.030(35) (defining “offender” to include “a person who … 
is less than eighteen years of age but whose case is under superior court 
jurisdiction under RCW 13.04.030”).  When the Legislature enacted the 
SRA in 1981, it designed the statute for fully culpable adult offenders, 
without “the benefit of … advances in the scientific literature” described 
in Roper and its progeny that show that “age may well mitigate a 
defendant’s culpability.”  O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d at 695. 
It is true that under O’Dell, a young defendant may argue that his 
or her youthfulness is a “mitigating circumstance[]” that warrants an 
“exceptional sentence below the standard range.”  RCW 9.94A.535(1). 
Crucially, however, it is still the defendant’s burden to “establish[]” the 





is likely sufficient for young-adult defendants like the one in O’Dell—a 
defendant who, although he was only a few days over 18 when he 
committed the crime at issue, was nonetheless old enough to vote, to serve 
on a jury, to purchase tobacco, and to be conscripted into the armed forces.  
A presumption that a legal adult has the characteristics of an adult makes 
sense. 
On the other hand, a presumption that a legal child has the 
characteristics of an adult does not make sense.  A juvenile defendant may 
struggle to establish youth as a mitigating circumstance for any of a 
number of reasons—ineffective or overextended counsel, inadequate 
resources to muster compelling expert and lay testimony, or simply a trial 
court’s reflexive but scientifically inaccurate belief that juveniles who 
commit “adult” crimes are somehow more mature than their peers.  None 
of those is a good reason to punish a child as an adult.  Absent an 
antecedent judicial finding (as in a declination hearing) that a juvenile 
defendant ought to be treated as an adult, assigning juvenile defendants the 
burden to prove youth as a mitigating factor prevents courts from 
appropriately considering the youthfulness of juvenile defendants.  If the 
State believes that a particular child charged with a crime is markedly 
unlike other children—i.e., that the defendant lacks the characteristics of 





bear the burden of establishing the juvenile acted with adult culpability.   
The legislature might be able to remedy this constitutional defect 
by amending adult sentencing laws to (1) eliminate mandatory sentence 
enhancements for juveniles tried as adults and (2) establish a rebuttable 
presumption that juvenile defendants tried in adult courts should receive 
exceptional sentences below the standard range.10  But it has not done so.  
In the meantime, the auto-decline statute denies juvenile defendants any 
opportunity to argue that treatment as adults is inappropriate and continues 
to send them to be tried and sentenced under unconstitutional procedures 
that do not adequately take their youthfulness into consideration.  Unless 
and until the Legislature significantly revises sentencing laws as they 
apply to juvenile defendants in adult courts, Washington’s auto-decline 
statute violates article I, section 14. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Court should agree with Petitioners that the auto-decline 
statute, RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v), violates the Eighth Amendment and 
article I, section 14 because it exposes juvenile defendants to adult 
sentencing laws without providing an opportunity for their youthfulness to 
be adequately considered.   
                                                 
10 However, legislative changes to the adult sentencing scheme would not be sufficient to 
address other potential constitutional problems with auto-decline, including due process 
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